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COMMENTS
THE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST:
STATE LAW PROBLEMS
I. INTRODUCTION
The real estate investment trust, by reason of a 1960 amendment to the In-
ternal Revenue Code," now receives conduit tax treatment, i.e., it is not taxed
at the entity level as is a corporation. Basically, the real estate investment trust
is a Massachusetts or business trust which has complied with the rigid require-
ments of the federal tax law.2
The Massachusetts trust3 has been subjected to varied tax treatment in the
past. Early tax statutes treated associations and corporations alike.4 A question
arose as to whether such statutes required a business trust to be treated as an
association. In Crocker v. Malley,5 the Supreme Court held that trustees were
not liable for taxes on dividends received. This decision involved the Income Tax
Act of 1913 which imposed a corporate tax on associations0 but exempted
trustees and associations acting in a fiduciary capacity.7 Subsequently, the
Treasury Department construed Crocker to mean that a trust was not to be
taxed as an association if the trustees were not subject to the beneficiaries'
control.8 The next decision of any significance, Hecht v,. Malley,9 questioned the
validity of the Crocker rule and suggested an active conduct test. After this case,
the Treasury Department amended its regulations to provide that a trust would
be considered an association if the functions of the trustees were not limited to
collecting rents, and if the trustees were really associated in the same manner as
the directors of a corporation.1 In 1935, in Morrissey v. Commissioner," a
"corporate attributes test" was promulgated. Under this rule, if a trust re-
sembled a corporation, it was taxed as one.' 2 After Morrissey, the business trust,
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ S56-53.
2. For an excellent discussion of the tax aspects of real estate investment trusts See Lynn,
Real Estate Investment Trusts: Problems and Prospects, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 73 (1962).
3. The Massachusetts trust has been called various names, e.g., "Busin(-s Trust," "Com-
mon-Law Trust," and "Joint Stock Company."
4. Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 172 imposed a tax on "every corporation,
joint stock company or association."
5. 249 US. 223 (1919).
6. Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 172.
7. Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 16S.
S. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1935).
9. 265 US. 144 (1924).
10. See IVT-2 Cum. Bull. 7 (1925). See also discussion in Mor.sey v. Commsioner, 296
U.S. 344, 353-54 (1935).
11. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
12. "'Association' implies associates. It implies the entering into a joint enterprise . . .
for the transaction of business." Id. at 356. The Court went on to say that "the inclusion of
associations with corporations implies resemblance. . . ." Id. at 357. The features of a
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at least for tax purposes, became an unfavorable entity and, therefore, was seldom
used by real estate syndicates. 13 Today, the Real Estate Investment Trust Act
removes, to some extent, the possibility of corporate tax treatment. This special
tax consideration, however, is afforded only to those realty trusts which comply
with certain requirements relating to organization, 14 transferability of shares, 1
assets, 16 activities 17 and management or control.' 8 But mere compliance with
these federal provisions does not guarantee, at the state level, the limited liability
benefits ordinarily accorded to such trusts. Some states, in effect, do not permit
the formation of realty trusts.19 In others, while no statutory prohibitions exist,
liability may be imposed upon the trustees and shareholder-beneficiaries. Ac-
cordingly, a Massachusetts court has held that an organization could be a trust
for income tax purposes and yet, under the common law of the state, be treated
as a partnership, with the attendant liabilities.20 Finally, additional difficulties
may result due to conflicts between various state securities regulations.
II. FORMATION
Montana, 21 North Dakotas2 and South Dakota23 have statutes which are
possibly too narrow in scope to permit the formation of a real estate invest-
ment trust. They allow real property to be held in trust only for certain
enumerated purposes.24 None of the purposes enumerated is broad enough to in-
clude a real estate investment trust. In fact, even foreign real estate investment
trusts are precluded from holding property in these states, since the pertinent
corporation could be listed as: 1) Title in the entity; 2) Centralization of management;
3) Continuity of life; 4) Limitation of liability; 5) Free transferability of interest. Id. at
359.
13. See Janin, Tax Aspects of Real Estate Syndication, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 60, 61-62
(1959).
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856(a).
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 856(a)(2), 856(a)(5).
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 856(c)(2)-(6).
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 856(a)(4), 856(c)(1).
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 856(a) (1); see also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856(a) (6).
19. See notes 21-23 infra.
20. State St. Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 41 N.E.2d 30 (1942).
21. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 86-105 (1947).
22. N.D. Cent. Code § 59-03-02 (1960).
23. S.D. Code § 59.0301 (1939).
24. E.g., the North Dakota statute provides: "Purposes for which express trusts created.
-Express trusts may be created for any of the following purposes: 1. To sell real prop-
erty and apply or dispose of the proceeds in accordance with the instrument creating the
trust; 2. To mortgage or lease real property for the benefit of annuitants or other legatees
or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon; 3. To receive the rents and profits of
real property and pay or apply them to the use of any person, whether ascertained at the
time of the creation of the trust or not, for himself or for his family during tie life of such
person or for any shorter term, subject to the rules of title 47, Property; or 4. To receive
the rents and profits of real property and to accumulate the same for the purposes and within
the limits prescribed by chapter 3 of title 47, Property." N.D. Cent. Code § 59-03-02 (1960).
[Vol. 31
statutes regulate the ownership of real property within the state and do not pur-
port to regulate the trust as an entityY2 Other states, as a matter of public pol-
icy, disfavor the trust as a form of doing business, thus making its use impracti-
cal. Since the passage of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act, however, several
states have attempted to eliminate formation problems by passing enabling
statutes2 6 In Texas, for example, investors in a trust formerly were not
entitled to limited liability unless it had complied with the state corporation
or limited partnership law.2 7 This made it foolhardy, if not impossible, for a
real estate investment trust to operate in that state. Earlier New York statutes,
while recognizing business trusts and affording shareholders limited liability,
were not broad enough to include realty trusts, and thus, amendment was
necessary.2 9 Washington, even before the Real Estate Investment Trust Act,
passed what would today be called an enabling statute.2 Prior to this enactment,
its courts treated business trusts as irregularly formed corporations and, hence,
violative of the state constitution 30 Even now, however, the constitutionality
of this statute would appear to be questionable. 3'
III. LIAiLITy or SH,-,REHOLDErs
The Real Estate Investment Trust Act requires that a realty trust be
"managed by one or more trustees.132 This provision was originally construed
by the Treasury Department to mean that the trustees must have "absolute
and exclusive control . . . free from any power of control on the part of its
shareholders other than the right to elect trustees. . . ."3 Under the original
interpretation, the beneficiaries of a qualified real estate investment trust would
necessarily enjoy the limited liability of corporate shareholders since it is an
established rule in states which recognize business trusts that the liability of
investors depends on the amount of control they exercise over the trust and
trustees.34 Thus, where investors possess excessive control, partnership liability
25. Ibid.
26. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 23000-03; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-2027 to -2033 (Supp. 1961);
N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 96; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4S-1S01 to -1204 (Supp. 1962); Te. Rev.
Civ. Stat. art. 6138A (1962).
27. See Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 594 (1925).
28. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 96.
29. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 23.90.010 to .90.900 (1961).
30. See State ex rel. Colvin v. Paine, 137 Wash. 566, 243 Pac. 2 (1926); State ex rel.
Range v. Hinkle, 126 Wash. 5S1, 219 Pac. 41 (1923).
31. See Note, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 305, 306 (1959) and cases cited therein; see aLzo, Com-
mittee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Associations, ABA Report on Real
Estate Investment Trusts, 16 Bus. Law. 900, 904 (1961) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
32. Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 856(a)(1).
33. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d) (1), 26 Fed. Reg. 604 (1961).
34. See Williams v. Inhabitants of Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N.E. 355 (1913), where the
so-called control test is fully discussed. This case did not deal directly with the liability of
shareholders to creditors, but was a taxation case. The court, however, said: "The right
to tax property as trust or as partnership property depends upon what the character of the
property taxed really is." Id. at 6, 102 N.E. at 356.
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arises.35 However, to meet objections by state securities commissioners that the
granting of absolute control to the trustees denied adequate protection to share-
holders and invited fraud, 3 6 the treasury regulation, as finally promulgated,
states:
The term trustee means a person who holds legal title to the property of the real
estate investment trust. ... [T]he trustee must have continuing exclusive authority
over the management of the trust, the conduct of its affairs, and the management and
disposition of the trust property. For example, such authority will be considered to
exist even though the trust instrument grants to the shareholders any or all of the
following rights and powers: To elect or remove trustees, to terminate the trust;
and to ratify amendments to the trust instrument proposed by the trustees. .... 3T
Inherent in this provision is the danger that the control powers granted to
the beneficiaries might be deemed excessive under state law. What constitutes
excessive control? It is safe to say that investors, unless of course they have
contracted with their creditors against the imposition of liability, cannot
retain the power to direct trustees in the details of management. The majority
of states, applying the "control test," hold that a true trust frees the bene-
ficiaries from individual liability,38 while a partnership does not.8 9 This test was
formulated by a Massachusetts court thus:
A declaration of trust or other instrument providing for the holding of property by
trustees for the benefit of the owners of assignable certificates representing the bene-
ficial interest in the property may create a trust or it may create a partnership.
Whether it is one or the other depends upon the way in which the trustees are to
conduct the affairs committed to their charge. If they act as principals and arc
free from the control of the certificate holders, a trust is created. .... 40
It is axiomatic that the nature of a business trust will be determined by the
terms of the trust instrument, for normally this agreement will give an accurate
reflection of the rights and duties of all concerned. 4 Control by the shareholders
35. See, e.g., Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S.W. 602 (1923); Goldwater v.
Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Il1. 321, 159
N.E. 250 (1927); Rossman v. Marsh, 287 Mich. 580, 283 N.W. 696, aff'd on rehearing, 287
Mich. 720, 286 N.W. 83 (1939); Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 1 S.W.2d 163 (1927);
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Copeland, 39 R.I. 193, 98 Ad. 273 (1916).
36. See Sobieski, State Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts--The
Midwest Position, 48 Va. L. Rev. 1069 (1962).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(1) (1962).
38. See note 35 supra.
39. See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Scully, 92 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.
1937) ; In re Conover, 295 11. App. 443, 14 N.E.2d 980 (1938) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Chartier,
305 Mass. 316, 25 N.E.2d 733 (1940) ; Brown v. Bedell, 263 N.Y. 177, 188 N.E. 641 (1934);
Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Sullivan, 103 Okla. 78, 229 Pac. 561 (1924).
40. Frost v. Thompson, 219 Mass. 360, 365, 106 N.E. 1009, 1010 (1914). The control
test, as such, was originally enunciated in Williams v. Inhabitants of Milton, 215 Mass. 1,
102 N.E. 355 (1913).
41. Koenig v. Johnson, 71 Cal. App. 2d 739, 163 P.2d 746 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945); Morrlss
v. Finkelstein, 127 SAV.2d 46 (Mo. App. 1939).
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need not be actually exercised. It is enough that the power exists.42
Certainly where the trustees and beneficiaries are one and the same, the
latter would be subject to liability regardless of the provisions in the trust
instrument.4 3 The mere power of the beneficiaries to hold meetings or to
demand occasional conferences4 s with the trustees to discuss the affairs of the
trust will not, per se, make them liable. Nor does the appointment by the
trustees of an advisory board from among the beneficiaries automatically impose
liability provided, however, that the trustees retain actual control of the trust
affairs. 6 The right of the beneficiaries (vested by the declaration of trust) to
fix or control the minimum sale price of lots has also been found inconclusive.
7
However, this right, coupled with any additional supervisory or management
powers, might be critical.4 S Correspondingly, where the declaration of trust
provided for annual meetings of the beneficiaries and authorized them to join
with the trustees in transacting trust business, to elect trustees annually, to
amend the trust instrument, to terminate the trust, and to restrict the power
of the trustees with respect to the issuance of additional shares under specified
circumstances, the organization was held to be a partnership and not a trust: 9
In general, "passive" privileges given to the beneficiaries have been found not
to conflict with the trustees' control. But what of the power to elect trustees at
stated intervals and the power to fill vacancies?"o Le-,y v. Neilis,01 a leading
Illinois case, held that the ability to elect trustees, even where coupled with
additional powers, 2 did not impose personal liability on the investors. Rhode
42. Simson v. Klipstein, 262 Fed. S23 (D.N.J. 1920); In re Associated Trust, 222 Fed.
1012 (D. Mass. 1914).
43. Enochs & Flowers, Ltd. v. Roell, 170 Miss. 44, 154 So. 299 (1934). Where the share-
holders and trustees are not identical, of course, a number of other factors would have to
'be considered as to whether or not a true trust existed.
44. Levy v. Nellis, 234 Ill. App. 22S, 1 N.E.2d 251 (1936); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Co. v. Copeland, 39 RI. 193, 9S At!. 273 (1916).
45. Greco v. Hubbard, 252 Mass. 37, 147 N.E. 272 (1925).
46. Krey Packing Co. v. Hitchings, 1S S.V.2d 123 (Mo. App. 1929).
47. Rossman v. Marsh, 237 Mich. 5S0, 233 N.WV. 696, aff'd on rehearing, 237 Mich. 720,
286 N.W. 83 (1939).
48. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Scully, 92 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1937).
49. Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Sullian, 103 Okla. 78, 229 Pac. 561 (1924); Marclulonis v.
Adams, 97 W. Va. 517, 125 S.E. 340 (1924).
50. E.g., such vacancies resulting from death, e-piration of their term of office, or their
resignation. See Gutelius v. Stanbon, 39 F.2d 621 (D. Fla. 1929); Levy v. Nellis, 234 Ill.
App. 223, 1 N.E.2d 251 (1936); Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 123, 225 Pac. 1045 (1924);
Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153, 190 Pac. 601 (1920); ABA Report, 16 Bus.
Law. 900, 907-10 (1961); see also Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Busine-s
Trusts, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 423, 436 (1923).
51. 24 I1l. App. 223, 1 N.E.2d 251 (1936).
52. Ibid. The trust instrument proided that in addition to the shareholders' power of
election, the trustees had a five year term of office with the right to fill any %acancy for
the unexpired term. The shareholders also had the power to amend the trust instrument by
a two-thirds vote and to hold regular and special meetings.
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Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Copeland5 3 reached the same conclusion in a case
where the shareholders had the power to amend the trust instrument, to remove
and replace trustees by majority vote, to call shareholders' meetings and to
terminate the business of the trust. There are, however, decisions to the con-
trary.54
Thus, in states which have not passed enabling statutes, it is not certain
whether the shareholder powers permitted in the treasury regulations" and
required by some state statutes will be considered excessive. On the other hand,
where enabling statutes have been enacted, the control problem is minimized,
especially where the statute has been constructed to conform to the Internal
Revenue Code.5 6
A. Effect of Nonliability Provisions
A nonliability clause, quite commonly found in trust instruments," usually
provides: that the beneficiaries are not to be personally or individually liable
for debts of the trust; that third persons dealing with the trustees shall look
solely to the assets of the trust for satisfaction of their claims; and that every
contract made by the trustees shall likewise contain a provision relieving the
beneficiaries of personal liability.58 Such a clause has been effective to preclude
beneficiary liability even in jurisdictions where the beneficiaries would other-
wise be liable under the control test or where the limited liability of business
trusts would not otherwise be recognized. 9 In these states, nonliability provi-
sions are not contrary to public policy,60 but even so, the creditor must have
knowledge of their existence.61
B. Denial of Limited Liability for Reasons Other Than Control
Arizona, in a leading case, 62 has held that business trusts operating in that
state are nothing more than organizations seeking corporate benefits without
53. 39 R.I. 193, 98 AtI. 273 (1916).
54. See Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); First Nat'l Bank v.
Chartier, 305 Mass. 316, 25 N.E.2d 733 (1940); Neville v. Gifford, 242 Mass. 124, 136 N.E.
160 (1922) (the trustees here were also the shareholders). See also Liquid Carbonic Co. v.
Sullivan, 103 Okla. 78, 229 Pac. 561 (1924).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(1) (1962).
56. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code §§ 23000-03.
57. For an example of such a form see Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928).
58. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928); Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252
S.W. 602 (1923); Krey Packing Co. v. Hitchings, 18 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. App. 1929).
59. Farmers' State Bank & Trust Co. v. Gorman Home Refinery, 3 S.W,2d 65 (Tex. Coin.
App. 1942); Shelton v. Montoya Oil & Gas Co., 292 S.W. 165 (Tex. Com. App. 1927).
60. Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250 (1927); McCarthy v. Parker,
243 Mass. 465, 138 N.E. 8 (1923); Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 1 S.W.2d 163 (1927).
61. Hunter v. Winter, 268 Ili. App. 487 (1932); Ing v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 216 Ky.
467, 287 S.W. 960 (1926); Graham Hotel Corp. v. Leader, 241 S.W. 700 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922); see also RFC v. Goldberg, 143 F.2d 752 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 770, re-
hearing denied, 323 U.S. 817 (1944).
62. Rubens v. Costello, 75 Ariz. 5, 251 P.2d 306 (1952); see also Reilly v. Clyne, 27
Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925).
[Vol. 31
COMMENTS
incorporation and, therefore, should be treated as corporations which have
failed to comply with the state corporation statute. Kansas' 3 and Texas 4
likewise, prior to enacting enabling acts, required a business trust to comply with
state corporation or limited partnership laws. 3 A similar problem may exist in
Washington, where the constitutionality of the "enabling" act is doubtful.c
C. Compliance Witz Enabling Acts and Possible Conflicts
Some states, in accord with their public policy, insist that certain powers,
greater than those permitted by the treasury regulations, be granted the share-
holders of realty trusts. The Washington statute requires the trust to give
beneficiaries the right to: call special meetings, 7 vote cumulatively, 3 remove
directors, 69 approve sales, leases or exchanges of corporate assets,-0 approve
mergers or consolidations, 71 and institute voluntary dissolutions.7 2
Certainly the right to call a special meeting or to vote cumulatively does not
interfere with the trustee's power of control, but it is arguable that the in-
vestor's right to approve specified acts of the trustee does. Actually, however,
the approval provisions of the Washington law are quite similar to the
provision in the treasury regulations affording shareholders the right to ratify
trust amendments proposed by the trustee. Although approval connotes agree-
ment prior to execution and ratification agreement thereafter, both terms here
are, in effect, synonymous in that they provide the beneficiaries with a passive
rather than an active power of control, i.e., in neither case can they initiate
the act approved or ratified. Nevertheless, a situation can be foreseen where,
because of arbitrary beneficiary action in refusing to approve a sale, the trustee
might be severely hampered in performing his duties and would in fact be
subject to shareholder control. Hence, a real estate investment trust should
exercise care in transacting business in those states with beneficiary requirements
similar to Washington's, for depending upon the interpretation given to these
powers, compliance with the particular state provision could prove disastrous.
The California Enabling Act of 196173 authorized the formation of a real
estate investment trust provided it complied with the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code,74 hence making the possibility of conflict remote. However,
the California securities law requires annual beneficiary meetings, limits
63. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-2027 to -203S (Supp. 1961).
64. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 613SA (1962).
65. Lim v. Houston, 123 Kan. 409, 255 Pac. 1105 (1927); Weber Engine Co. v. Alter,
120 Kan. 557, 245 Pac. 143 (1926) ; Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tem. 53, 274 S. 554 (1925).
66. See note 31 supra.
67. W"'ash. Rev. Code Ann. 3 23.01.280 (1961).
68. 'Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23.01.290 (1961).
69. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23.01.320 (1961).
70. Wash. Rex. Code Ann. § 23.01.390 (1961).
71. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23.01.470 (1961).
72. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23.01.530 (1961).
73. Cal. Corp. Code H3 23000-03.
74. Cal. Corp. Code § 23000.
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election of trustees to one year terms75 and stipulates that trust records must
be available for inspection by the shareholders. 76 How this affects the trust's
status for tax purposes is undetermined. It would appear that the shareholder
powers here are passive in nature and will not alter the trust's tax status.77
A section in the Texas statute provides that "the declaration of trust may
be amended upon receipt of the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-
thirds (2/3) of the outstanding shares of the trust.... ."78 If by this language the
Texas legislature intended to vest in shareholders the right to initiate amend-
ments to the trust instrument, a serious conflict with the treasury regulations
might arise. The tax status of the trust would be jeopardized, for the bene-
ficiaries would possess an active control power.
New York, on the other hand, has taken perhaps the safest route by providing
the beneficiaries only with the power to terminate the trust by a majority vote.70
In other words, not only does the real estate investment trust face no control
problem, but there is also no possibility of conflict with the treasury regulations.
In those states where there is presently a conflict, it would seem reasonable
to assume that the situation will be ameliorated by future judicial decisions.
Howevei, until favorable decisions are rendered, a real estate investment trust
will have to weigh the advisability of avoiding business in that state against
altering its trust instrument to meet the more stringent state requirements,
thereby risking loss of its favored tax status.
IV. LIABMIITY OF TRUSTEES
A. Beneficiaries
Whether or not a real estate investment trust is determined by a court to be a
"trust or a partnership, the trustees are in a fiduciary relationship with the
shareholders of the trust."80 Therefore, the trustees must act in the interest of
the trust's beneficiaries and not their own.81 As a general rule, however, the
trustee is not an insurer, but rather is liable only for the lack of ordinary care. 82
75. Cal. Admin. Code tit. 10, § 549.6(e), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 8629-1. Note that this
one provision is actually a combination of three rights: (a) the annual meeting, (b) the
election of trustees, and (c) the term of office for trustees to be one year. The election of
trustees is provided for in the regulations, whereas the other two are not. This section forms
part of the California securities regulations.
76. Cal. Admin. Code tit. 10, § 549.6(g), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. Uf 8629-1.
77. See notes 67-72 supra and accompanying text.
78. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6138A, § 23 (1962). If the Texas legislature
meant that the beneficiaries shall have a mere right to ratify amendments proposed by the
trustees, there is no problem, since it would be completely in accord with the treasury regula-
tions.
79. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 42-d. This section also provides the trustees with a right
of termination of the trust.
80. Haskell v. Patterson, 165 Ark. 65, 262 S.W. 1002 (1924); Culp v. Robey, 299 S.W.
846 (Tex. Com. App.), reversing 294 S.W. 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
81. Page v. Natural Gas & Fuel Co., 35 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1929).
82. R.C.L. Trusts §§ 130, 160 (1929).
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B. Third Parties
It is a general rule in the law of trusts that trustees are personally liable
for both the contracts84 and tortss5 of the enterprise, unless they have specifically
contracted against such liability.Gs What constitutes "contracting against
liability" is a problem on which courts have differed.87 The inclusion of an
express disclaimer clause in the contract will certainly accomplish thisP9 A mere
oral stipulation, though the contract be in writing, also has been held sufficient
to exempt the trustees from liability6 0 A disclaimer clause in the trust instru-
ment alone, however, without a similar clause in the contract, may leave the
trustees personally liable even where the contracting party is aware of it. For
example, the clause in the trust instrument may provide that all trust contracts
must contain a similar disclaimer. °0 At least one court has held that a promise
not to hold the trustees personally liable need not always be express, but can
be implied.91 On the other hand, if the trust instrument does not obligate the
trustees to provide a similar clause in their contracts, the trustee may very well
be liable. 2 In this situation, however, where the third party is aware of the
83. To insure against personal loss it is usually necessary for trustees to obtain compre-
hensive liability insurance, since contracts designed to exempt them from liability are, be-
cause of the doctrine of respondeat superior, generally held to be violations of public policy.
Fisheries Co. v. McCoy, 202 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). However, where the tortious
act is not that of the trustee personally, he is entitled to reimbursement from the trust, Smith
v. Rizzuto, 133 Neb. 655, 276 N.W. 406 (1937) ; In re Lathers, 137 AMc. 226, 243 N.Y. Supp.
366 (Surr. Ct. 1930); and, therefore, such insurance, although practical, may not be
absolutely necessary.
84. See Taylor v. Davis, 110 U.S. 330 (18S4); Betts v. Harlmthorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252
S.W. 602 (1923); Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); Redew, Printing
& Stationery Co. v. McCoy, 276 Ill. App. 580 (1934); Darling v. Buddy, 313 Mlo. 734, 1
S.W.2d 163 (1927).
85. Alphonso E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 46 Cal. App. 2d 6M, 116 P.2d 786
(Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Piff v. Berresheim, 405 IMI. 617, 92 N.E.2d 113 (1950).
86. See notes SS-90 infra.
87. See, e.g., § 20 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law which provide:, that
where it appears on the instrument that a duly authorized agent is acting in a representative
capacity for a disclosed principal, the signer will not be liable on the instrument. Com-
pliance with this section would relieve trustees from personal liability. Gutelius v. Stanbon,
39 F.2d 621 (D. Fla. 1930); Tebaldi Supply Co. v. Macmillan, 292 Mass. 384, 193 N. 651
(1935); Pennsylvania Co. v. Wallace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 A.2d 71 (1943). A similar result
might reasonably be anticipated in those states which have adopted the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. ABA Report, 16 Bus. Law. 900, 911 (1961); see Uniform Commercial Code
§ 3-403.
88. See, e.g., Schumann-Henk v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250 (1927); Hamilton
v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 Pac. 1045 (1924); Dunning v. Gibbs, 213 Ky. 81, 220 S.W.
483 (1926).
89. Taylor v. Davis, 110 US. 330 (1884).
90. Farmers' State Bank & Trust Co. v. Gorman Home Refinery, 3 S.W.2d 65 (Tea
Com. App. 1928); Shelton v. Montoya Oil & Gas Co., 292 S.W. 165 (Tem. Civ. App. 1927).
91. Review Printing '& Stationery Co. v. McCoy, 291 Ill. App. 524, 10 N.E.2d 506 (1937).
92. Larson v. Sylvester, 282 Mass. 352, 1835 N.E. 44 (1933).
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original disclaimer, the trustee will be exculpated.93 At least two states,
Pennsylvania 94 and Oklahoma,9 5 have provided statutory exemptions from
liability for trustees, unless the contracts specifically provide otherwise. Wis-
consin96 and Michigan 97 impose personal liability on the trustees merely for
failure to comply with state filing, recording, and reporting requirements.
V. SECURITIES RE&GULATION
Financing the real estate investment trust will, for the most part, be ac-
complished by sales of securities, and, hence, the whole area of federal and
state securities regulation must be considered.
A. Securities Act of 1933
There is no doubt that a share of, or beneficial interest in, a real estate
investment trust is a security as defined in the Securities Act of 1933.98 As early
as 1935, it was held that a security includes a participating trust certificate.9
Indeed, the Securities and Exchange Commission has assumed this. It has
promulgated regulations specifically aimed at the real estate investment trust,100
and has devised a special registration form for it.101 The registration state-
ment requires disclosure of all the pertinent facts concerning the proposed sale.
A prospectus containing most of this same information must be distributed to
each prospective buyer. In line with its philosophy of full disclosure, the 1933
act prescribes the content and form to be followed in the prospectus' 2 and regu-
lates the manner in which the security may be advertised.10 3 Violators of the act
93. Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930).
94. Fiduciaries Act of 1949, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 320.101 to .1401 (1950).
95. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 174 (1949).
96. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 226.14(q) (1957). See also ABA Report, 16 Bus. Law. 900, 903
(1961) and especially note 20 supra and accompanying text.
97. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.87 (1948). This section was held to apply to business trusts
in Nedeau v. United Petroleum, 251 Mich. 673, 232 N.W. 202 (1930).
98. "The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evl-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or participation In,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(1) (1958).
99. SEC v. Jones, 12 F. Supp. 210, 212 (S.).N.Y.), aff'd, 79 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1935),
rev'd on other grounds, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
100. Proposed SEC Rule § 240.106-10, 27 Fed. Reg. 8280 (1962) (rule concerning re-
demptive securities).
101. Form S-11, 17 C.F.R. § 239.18 (Supp. 1962).
102. 48 Stat. 81 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1958).
103. The term "prospectus" is given such a broad definition that it includes the common
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are subject to both civil and penal liability. Jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission is based on use of the mails or other facility of interstate
commerce.
It should be noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission does not
favor "open end" real estate investment trusts. 10 Objection stems from the fact
that an "open end" real estate investment trust could not have a realistic method
of valuing certificates because the majority of its assets would not, in the
strict sense, have a market value.105 Accordingly, the Securities and Exchange
Commission recently promulgated a proposed rule limiting the "open end" or
redeemable certificate mechanism to those entities whose assets are composed of
items which have a ready valuation.'00
B. Blue Sky Laws
After complying with the Securities Act of 1933, the issuing promoters of the
real estate investment trust face the task of "blue skying" the issue. Here, the
problems are twofold-those applicable to any security issue, and those, by
reason of special state regulations, peculiar to real estate investment trusts.
1. Generally
Iost state blue sky laws have provisions relating to fraudulent practices.
These provisions vary in detail, imposing both affirmative and negative obliga-
tions, and for the most part, prohibit fraudulent acts, deceptive practices, and
material omissions. 07 Fraud is usually dealt with at three levels: the sale or
form of advertisements. 43 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1953). Thus
advertisements are regulated because they are included within the definition of "prospectus."
104. "Indeed the first registration statement of a real estate investment trust filed with
the SEC was an open-end trust. After considerable study and soul-searching the SEC tenta-
tively decided that it will not dear an open-end trust primarily because there is no way in
which a trust could adequately inform the investing public of the trust's limited ability to
redeem shares upon demand." Williamson, The Real Estate Investment Trust Act, The
Catalyst Which Is Making Real Estate "Go Public," 27 3. Property Management No. 2, at
74 (1961).
105. Ibid.
106. "It shall constitute a 'manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance' as used in
section 10(b) of the Act [Securities Exchange Act of 1934] for any person in connection
with the offering or sale of any equity security of any issuer to make any representation to
the effect that-(a) the offering price of such security is based upon and varies ith the
current value of its proportionate share of the assets of the issuer represented by such
security; or (b) such security is or will he redeemable at the option of the holder at a
price which is based upon and varies with the current value of such proportionate share,
unless substantially all of the assets of the issuer consist of cash, cash items and securities
(other than mortgages and other liens on and interests in real estate) for which market
quotations are readily available and which are readily marketable." SEC Rule § 240.1C5-10,
27 Fed. Reg. 82S0 (1962). "This matter has become of particular interest in connection Vith
proposals by certain real estate investment companies to offer redeemable securities." Ibid.
107. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1991 (1956), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 6261; Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-287 (1960), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 10124.
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offer, 08 the registration statement, 10 9 and misrepresentations that registration of
the security constitutes approval or endorsement of the issue by the particular
state official charged with enforcing the applicable statute." 0 It is generally
agreed, however, that enforcement of state blue sky laws is virtually impossible
where the guilty party was never subject to the jurisdiction of a particular
state."'
2. Specific Provisions in the Blue Sky Laws
The activities of those dealing with securities of real estate investment
trusts have been thoroughly regulated by the various state securities com-
missioners. Whether or not the public needs the ample protection afforded
by these regulations has been the subject of comment.'1 2 Perhaps this stringent
attitude is based on the realty trust's similarity to the regulated investment
company, which has been the subject of extensive regulation.'1" On the other
hand, this attitude might merely be based on the fear that the real estate in-
vestment trust provides a fertile ground for unscrupulous promoters.11 4 What-
ever be the case, some sort of uniformity seems to be emerging as more and more
states formally or informally adopt the policies enunciated by the Midwest
Securities Commissioners' Association." 5
3. Midwest Securities Commissioners' Association Statement of Policy
a. The Trust Structure
Under the Midwest regulations there must be a minimum of three trustees who
can serve for not more than three years.'10 This term is not absolute, however,
for the trust instrument must provide that a trustee can be removed by a two-
thirds vote of the trust's outstanding beneficiaries." 7 Further, the trustees
108. See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 53, § 28 (Supp. 1961), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. U 5201; Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-287 (1960), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 10124; Ga. Code tit. 97, § 11 (1933),
1 Blue Sky L. Rep. IU 14111.
109. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 121/2, § 137.12(E) (Smith-Hurd 1960), 1 Blue Sky L.
Rep. ff 16212; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-1264 (Supp. 1959), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. f 19213.
110. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1993 (1956), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. f1 6263; Ala.
Code tit. 53, § 41 (Supp. 1961), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. f1 5214; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1251
(Supp. 1961), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 7117.
111. See 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 84-85 (2d ed. 1961).
112. See Sobieski, State Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts--The
Midwest Position, 48 Va. L. Rev. 1069, 1075 (1962) ; Armstrong, State Securities Regulation
of Real Estate Investment Trusts-An Attorney's Viewpoint, 48 Va. L. Rev. 1082, 1103
(1962).
113. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to
-52 (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
114. See Sobieski, supra note 112, at 1075.
115. Revised Midwest Securities Commissioners Association Statement of Policy Re-
garding Real Estate Investment Trusts, Illinois Securities Division Bull., No. 101, § B(1) (a)
(Supp., Oct. 27, 1961), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754 [hereinafter cited as Midwest Rules].
116. California requires that the trustees be elected annually. Cal. Admin. Code tit. 10,
§ 549.2, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 8629-1.
117. Midwest Rules § B(1) (d), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754.
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cannot limit any liability arising by reason of bad faith, wilful malfeasance,
gross negligence, or reckless disregard of duty.118 The regulations also require
that the trustees have absolute and exclusive control over the management of
the trust and its property. 119 This provision seems paradoxical in light of the
many restrictions placed on the trustees' power and the fact that they may be
removed by a vote of the beneficiaries. Notwithstanding their right to absolute
and exclusive control, the trustees are permitted initially only to enter into
advisory contracts for a period up to three years. Moreover, such agreements
must be terminable on sixty days notice and subsequent contracts may not
exceed one year.120 The expenses which the trustees may incur in promotion,''
annual operations,'122 and purchasing real property'1 are also limited, while the
compensation of investment advisors may not exceed one half of one per cent
of the net value of the trust assets managed by the trustees. 12
The regulations require that the investing policy of the trust be stated
"with reasonable particularity."'12 Furthermore, disclaimers of liability must
be placed in all of the trust's contracts and adequate liability insurance must
be acquired.126 Specified information is required to be made available to bene-
ficiaries. This would be accomplished by annual reports,' 27 annual meetings,'2 g
special meetings (called by a written request of twenty-five per cent of the
beneficiaries),'-"' and distribution statements disclosing the source of the
funds allocated.130
The declaration of trust may not be amended except by a written consent
of two-thirds of the beneficiaries. 31 This, however, does not apply to initiating
amendments, but only to ratification of those made or initiated by the trustees.
The trust can be terminated in the same fashion, i.e., by written consent of
two-thirds of the beneficiaries. 32 The beneficiaries are further protected from
possible conflicts of interest on the part of the trustees, employees, advisors,
or officers, in that the trust is prohibited from acquiring property from them,
except in the formation process or immediately thereafter.13 Finally, the trust
must have a minimum capital of $100,000.14
11S. Midwest Rules § B(1)(c), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. fi 4754.
119. Midwest Rules § B(ll), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 9 4754.
120. Ibid.
121. lidwest Rules § B(12) (a), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 4754.
122. Midwest Rules § B(12)(b), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ' 4754.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. lidwest Rules § B(2), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. fi 4754.
126. Midwest Rules § B(3), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754.
127. Midwest Rules § B(4), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. f 4754.
128. Midwest Rules § B(5), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. f 4754.
129. M.idwest Rules § B(6), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754.
130. Midwest Rules § B(S), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 4754.
131. Mlidwest Rules § B(9), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754.
132. Midwest Rules § B(10), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754.
133. lidwest Rules § B(1) (b), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. U 4754.
134. Mlidwest Rules § C, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
b. Prohibited Activities
The Midwest Commissioners would also limit the investment activities of the
trust in the manner that banks and insurance companies are regulated under
investment laws. Investment in commodities is prohibited entirely,'85 while
speculation in unimproved lands is prohibited to the extent that it exceeds five
per cent of the value of the trust. 3 0 Investment in mortgages on unimproved
land or with other than first priority is also curtailed.1 87 The percentage allow-
able is governed by local law applicable to savings and loan associations. 38 The
trust may not invest in real property which is already mortgaged, unless the
mortgage is held by a bank or other institutional lender. 13 9 However, if the
mortgage involved is a purchase money mortgage, the restriction does not
apply.' 40 The total encumbrance for property must not exceed two-thirds of
its fair market value.141 Investment in unsecured loans and short sales may
not exceed eight per cent of the net value of the trust.142 The trust may not
trade 43 or underwrite the securities of others, 44 nor issue redeemable
securities, 45 stock of more than one class, 4 6 warrants, or options.'4 7 In addition,
it may not hold securities in any company or other real estate investment trust
which is actively violating any of the Midwest regulations. 48 Finally, there is
a saving clause to eliminate possible conflicts with the Internal Revenue Code.14
4. States With Regulations Other Than the Midwest Policy
Alabama has adopted regulations which are not as extensive as those of the
Midwest policy.'50 There, the trust must have a stated capital and a specific
number of shares available for sale.' 5 ' This excludes the "open end" trust. A
corporate trustee, once appointed, must be retained.9 2 To protect shareholders,
a surety bond, conditioned upon faithful application of the funds received from










§ B(14)(b), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. II 4754.
§ B(14)(a), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. fi 4754.
§ B(14) (c), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754.
§ B(14)(e), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 11 4754.
§ B(14)(f), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. II 4754.
Midwest Rules § B(14)(h), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 4754.
Midwest Rules § B(14)(1), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 4754.
Midwest Rules § B(14)(j), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754.
Midwest Rules § B(14)(i), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. II 4754.
Midwest Rules § B(14) (m), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 4754.
Midwest Rules § B(14) (k), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 11 4754.
Midwest Rules § B(15), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 4754.
Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 5625.
Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 1, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 5625.
Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 2, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. I 5625.
Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 3, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5625.
[Vol. 31
The trust manager is held to the same degree of accountability as the trustees
and he may not accept bonuses from third persons, nor gain, directly or
indirectly, from trust contracts.Z 4 Any contract in which the trustee or trust
manager has a private interest is conclusively deemed fraudulent, and is
voidable at the election of any of the beneficiaries.10 Furthermore, no transac-
tion can be made with trusts or companies which have interlocking trustees,
directors, or managers.!G No commissions are allowed on the sale or exchange
of securities or real estate in the same transaction.aa? All of the trust properties
are required to be held in the name of the trusteelas and the legal or equitable
rights of the beneficiaries cannot be limited by any provision in the declaration
of trust.15 9 In addition, commissions or discounts on shares cannot exceed ten
per cent. 6 0 To insure policing of these provisions, the books of the trust must
be kept open for inspection by the beneficiaries.' 0 '
In Nebraska, the issuer must sign an agreement which provides in part that:
No applicant receiving an authorization order [for the sale of securities] . . . shall
declare or distribute a dividend of any kind or in any amount whatsoever until such
a dividend has been actually earned and received by the applicant through the
medium of net profits earned and received by the applicant from its business at the
time such dividend is declared.' 62
It is, therefore, impossible to take advantage of accelerated depreciation to give
the investor a tax-free return of capital, a result which may well discourage a
company from registering its securities in Nebraska.
Several states follow the Midwest policy informally; that is to say, because
state securities commissioners are given discretion to prohibit the sale of,
or to attach conditions to, an issue,'0 3 they can impose the Midwest policy even
in the absence of specific regulations. When a real estate investment trust seeks
to sell its securities in such states, the securities commissioner can attach the
condition that the issuer comply with the rules promulgated by the Midwest
Commissioners.
The Mlidwest rules have been adopted or used as a guide even by states
which are not members of the Midwest Association. A recent survey indicates
that many states have specific regulations for the securities of a real estate in-
vestment trust, or that they have adopted part of the Midwest policy. Other
154. Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 4(a), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5625.
155. Alabama Sec. Comn'n, Rule 15 § 4(c), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 625.
156. Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 4(d), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. f 5625.
157. Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 4(e), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 5625.
153. Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 4(f), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5625. This provi-on
narrows the three possible ways of holding title to property as spzcificd in the treasury
regulations, i.e., title in the trust, trustee, or nominee. Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1(d) (1) (1962).
159. Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 5, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5625.
160. Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 7, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5625.
161. Alabama Sec. Comm'n, Rule 15 § 6, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5625.
162. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 31-319 (Supp. 1962), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 30603.
163. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 502.7(9) (1946), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. g 13107.
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states indicated that while they were studying the matter, they had not passed
any specific regulations.'" New Hampshire said that it refuses to qualify real
estate investment trust securities. 1 5 In some of these states, since no rules ap-
pear either in the statutes or regulations, the only way to uncover a definite
policy would seem to be by actual experience.
5. New York
In New York, before securities of a real estate investment trust can be sold,
a statement must be filed with the Department of Law.100 The Attorney General
then has fifteen days in which to issue a letter stating that the issue has been
filed, thereby making the statement effective.'0 7 Offers, advertisements and sales
are prohibited prior to this letter. Dissemination of preliminary prospectuses and
circulation of nonfirm offers are permitted, however, and in fact, are allowed
even before an offering statement is filed.108 In addition, all money raised must
be held in a trust fund until it is actually used. 08 Since registration is only
required of real estate securities, realty trusts receive careful scrutiny. In this
connection, it has been observed that "several R.E.I.T.'s, which have survived
the Midwest Rules and SEC, decided to stay out of New York after an
initial conference with an examiner from the New York Attorney General's
office." ' 70
164. Six states have formal regulations governing the registration of real estate invest-
ment trusts: Alabama, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5625; California, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 91 8629-1;
Kansas, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. fI 19612; Oklahoma, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. f 39632; Tennessee,
2 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 45626.
Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont and Wisconsin
have indicated either a formal adoption of the Midwest policy or an informal attempt to
follow it. See Address by David Clurman, Special Assistant Attorney General of New York,
to the Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Inv. Funds, May 25, 1962 at 16-22 [hereinafter cited as
Address to the Nat'l Ass'n]. Florida and Texas follow part of the Midwest rules. Id. at 17,
21. "Maine has indicated that it has no special rules ... but ... it is working on the matter.
." Id. at 18. "New Hampshire . . . wrote ... 'we do not qualify the securities of any real
estate investment trust for sale .... '" Id. at 20. "Ohio . . . is reserving action in this area
until they can observe what abuses or contingencies may arise." Ibid. "Virginia reported
that it had no special rules ... other than the requirement that the following legend appear
in all prospectuses used in Virginia: 'This investment trust is not a corporation and, there-
fore, the holders of the shares may be liable for debts or other liabilities of the trust."' Id.
at 22. "Washington stated that it will not accept any filings of real estate investment trusts
until such time as the legality or constitutionality of this matter has been settled ..
Ibid.
165. Id. at 20.
166. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-e(a), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 35102-4.
167. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-e(2), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. f1 35102-4.
168. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-e(1) (a), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 35102-4.
169. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-h, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. ff 35102-7.
170. Address to the Nat'l Ass'n at 5-6. "[Mlost of those R.E.I.Ts eventually had to come
to New York, the financial capital of the world, to sell. But only after they made Important
disclosures and clarifications we thought were lacking." Id. at 6.
In placing emphasis on "full disclosure," rather than on the quality of the
securities, 171 the New York approach is similar to that of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The adequacy and accuracy of the information dis-
seminated is the primary concern. It is safe to say that if a trust is newly
formed or its principals have little or no experience, that fact should appear
in the prospectus. 172 It should also be stated that the investor will be relying
solely on the ability of the trustees to invest the proceeds. 173 Factors such as
limitations on voting rights, restrictions on the trustee in buying and selling and
other areas of unusual risk should be clearly brought to the attention of the
investor. 7 4 The investment policy should be dearly epressed and should, in
fact, be that which the promoters are intending to pursue. In this connection,
specific returns should not be promised where there are too many unpredictable
conditions. Of course, where the property or properties are specified and they do
have a record of prior earnings on which to base anticipated distributions,
then the promise of a specified return is permissible. 170, The use of terms such
as "tax free" should be avoided and it should be made dear to the investor
that the tax treatment can be affected by changes in the tax law or in the
treasury regulations.176
The amount of time the trustees are going to devote to their duties should
be indicated. 177 Furthermore, if the trustees' salaries are in some way based on
variable factors, it should be pointed out that in some instances they may
have the power to increase their own compensation.178 In addition to these
registration requirements, New York, unlike other states, investigates the
background of the trust's principals and has experts examine the property
involved.' 79
6. Enforcement of Midwest and Quasi-Midwest Rules
It is to be noted that the Midwest Commissioners concentrated on the
activity and the internal structure of the issuer, rather than sales of securities
and the contemplated enforcement of blue sky laws, to insure full disclosure and
eliminate deceptive practices. Where do the commissioners get such broad
powers? Usually the state statutes give them the power to promulgate regula-
tions and attach conditions to registration necessary to the enforcement of the
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 6.
173. Ibid.
174. Id. at 6-7.
175. Id. at 9. "In this area, each offering circular must be judged on its on merits vith
respect to full disclosure and unwarranted use of imagination." Ibid.
176. Id. at 10-11.
177. Id. at 13.
178. E.g., "In the event... compensation is determined on the basis of total gro:3 assets
of the trust... the trustees can themselves increase their compensation by simply increasing
the mortgage indebtedness of the trust. .. I" bid.
179. Id. at 15.
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act. 180 What is necessary for enforcement would probably be resolved in favor
of the commissioners. Such sweeping power, however, can easily be extended to
regulate any form of business, provided that the business is seeking to register
for permission to sell securities. The Midwest policy seems to contemplate
achieving enforcement at the outset, with the sanction that if the trust does not
comply with the securities provisions, it will not be permitted to sell. Consider
the case where after permission has been granted and all the securities sold, the
trust engages in prohibited activities by amending the trust instrument. What
could be done to stop it? Could the trustees be enjoined? Would they be civilly
liable? This would depend on the manner in which the commissioner treated
the rules at the outset. If, for example, they were adopted as regulations, they
would have the force and effect of legislation and, hence, the particular state
statute must be examined to determine the consequences of violating the regula-
tion.' 8 ' If the rules were attached as conditions to registration, the same result
would probably follow.'82  As a practical matter, however, enforcement of the
securities regulation might be difficult where the trust, although within the
jurisdiction of a particular state, is in fact operating in another state and, thus,
is not physically present in the state in question.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Real Estate Investment Trust Act has been described as a "catalyst" to
public holdings in real estate. 8 3 There are, as noted however, many problems
at the state level involving formation, investors' and trustees' liability and
securities regulation. The "catalyst," itself, if the Treasury formula be given
precise application, may, instead of producing success for the realty trust,
precipitate conditions which invite its abandonment.
180. See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 53, § 29A (Supp. 1961), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. g 5202.
181. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 10-04-08.1 (Supp. 1961), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. 1 37209.
182. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 26100, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. 1 8391.
183. Williamson, The Real Estate Investment Trust Act, The Catalyst Which Is Making
Real Estate "Go Public," 27 J. Property Management No. 2, at 68 (1961).
